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Fundamentality and the Mind-Body 
Problem 
 
I: Introduction 
In the recent metaphysics literature, a number of philosophers have independently endeavoured to 
marry sparse ontology to abundant truth. The aim is to keep ontological commitments minimal, 
whilst allowing true sentences to quantify over a vastly greater range of entities than those which 
they are ontologically committed to. For example, an ontological commitment only to concrete, 
microscopic simples might be conjoined with a commitment to truths such as ‘There are twenty 
people working in this building’ and ‘There are prime numbers greater than 5.’ Quinean orthodoxy 
tells us that if a sentence quantifies over people and numbers, then its truth can only be bought with 
an ontological commitment to people and numbers. But these radicals want more of a bargain: 
truths bought more cheaply that their quantificational price tags suggest is possible.1  
The aim of making sense of this kind of ‘cheap truth’ is to reconcile two powerful theoretical pulls. 
On the one hand Occam’s Razor pulling in the direction of parsimony, and on the other hand 
common sense pulling us in the direction of profligacy. The taste for desert landscapes is in tension 
with the Moorean resistance to abandoning our pre-theoretical commitments to tables, people, 
planets, numbers and sets. If we can make sense of cheap truth, then we can have our cake and eat 
it. Neither parsimony nor common sense need be abandoned.  
Discussion and defence of cheap truth has taken place almost wholly within metaphysics, and has 
had little interaction with a more familiar and longer running issue in philosophy of mind, namely 
the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists about consciousness. The aim of the paper is 
to press the importance of interaction between these two areas of the philosophical literature. I will 
present a significant challenge for the defenders of cheap truth theory, which has its roots in 
discussions of the mind-body problem.  
Anti-physicalists have arguments to the conclusion that the truths about consciousness cannot be 
accounted for in physicalist terms. Those arguments themselves do not threaten cheap truth theory, 
as there are forms of anti-physicalism consistent with cheap truth theory. However, I will propose a 
new argument, using the key premises of the standard anti-physicalist arguments, to the conclusion 
                                                          
1 Cameron 2008, 2010, Horgan and Potrč 2008. Sider 2009, 2012a, 2012b Williams 2012. Fine 2001 is an 
important influence on many of these views, but is not himself a cheap truth theorist. 
that truths about conscious subjects cannot be accounted for in terms of the minimal ontological 
commitments favoured by the defenders of cheap truth. I will not defend the premises of that 
argument; there is enough discussion of this already in the philosophy of mind. But if this argument 
is valid, then cheap truth theorists are obliged to engage in the debates in the philosophy of mind 
concerning the truth-values of those key premises.  
2: Horgan and Potrč’s account of cheap truth 
Let us define ‘cheap truth theories’ as those which are committed to the following two theses: 
Miminal Commitments – All objects in the correct ontology are concrete and simple. 
Moorean Truth – Scientifically informed common sense is largely correct, in the sense that our 
ordinary talk of composite objects, such as tables and planets, and abstract objects, such as sets and 
numbers is mostly true (or at least, to the degree that it is significantly false, this is the result of 
scientific, not metaphysical, ignorance). 
A number of proposals for making sense of cheap truth theory have been made in recent years, and I 
think that the challenge I wish to present applies to all of them. However, I shall focus on the version 
of cheap truth theory articulated by Terry Horgan and Matjaz Potrč, and construe cheap truth theory 
in their terms.2  
Horgan and Potrč take truth to be semantically correct affirmability under contextually operative 
semantic standards. For a sentence to be semantically correct it must correspond to the world. 
However, there are two ways in which a sentence might correspond to the world: directly or 
indirectly. For a sentence to directly correspond to the world is roughly for its structure to mirror the 
structure of the corresponding state of affairs, i.e. the entities it quantifies over correspond to 
entities in the world, its predicates correspond to properties/relations in the world, and the relevant 
entities stand in relations/instantiate properties in the way that is suggested by the sentence’s 
superficial grammar.3 The sentence ‘God is angry’ directly corresponds to the world if the world 
contains God instantiating the property of being angry. A sentence indirectly corresponds to the 
world just in case it corresponds to the world in a way that is not direct. The sentence ‘The table is 
near to the chair’ indirectly corresponds to the world if it corresponds to the state of affairs of some 
particles arranged table-wise being located near to some particles arranged chair-wise. 
                                                          
2 Horgan and Potrč 2008.  
3 Although this goes beyond what Horgan and Potrč suggest, it may be possible to give an account of direct 
correspondence which does not require predicates to correspond to properties, and which would thereby be 
compatible with austere nominalism. I will not explore this here.    
Horgan and Potrč suggest that most of the time the contextually operative standards which govern 
semantic correctness require only an indirect correspondence between sentence and world. If we 
are discussing how best to arrange the living room for a party, and I say, ‘Well, the table is near to 
the chair’, the semantic standards in operation in that conversation do not entail that the semantic 
correctness of the sentence requires a direct correspondence, i.e. that in the relevant bit of reality 
there is a table located near to a chair. An indirect correspondence to particles arranged table-wise 
located near particles arranged chair-wise will suffice to make the sentence semantically correct. 
In relatively few contexts does semantic correctness require a direct correspondence between 
sentence and world, according to Horgan and Potrč. The most obvious case is when we are 
practicing ontology. In the metaphysics seminar room, the sentence ‘The table is near to the chair’ is 
semantically correct only if, in the relevant bit of reality, there exists a table and there exists a chair, 
and the table is located near to the chair. It may also be that expressions of our theological 
commitments require direct correspondence in order to be semantically correct: ‘God is perfectly 
good’ is arguably true only if God exists and has the property of being perfectly good.4 
Separating out these two contexts allows Horgan and Potrč to embrace both ontological austerity 
and commonsense profligacy. Inside the ontology room, truth sentences quantify over simple, 
concrete objects. Outside the ontology room, true sentences quantify over the abundance of 
commonsense objects: tables, rocks, numbers, sets, etc. The semantic correctness and thereby 
truth, of sentences uttered outside the ontology room, is guaranteed by their indirect 
correspondence to facts about the simple concrete objects quantified over in the ontology room. 
Cheap truth theories, as I have defined them, involve the thesis of Minimal Commitments. For most 
of this paper I am going to construe Minimal Commitments as micro-simplism, according to which 
we are ontologically committed only to microscopic simples (or ‘micro-simples’ for short). This is the 
most straightforward way of understanding Minimal Commitments, and it is the way most cheap 
truth theorists construe it. 
                                                          
4 It seems that Horgan and Potrč implicitly assume some metaphysical privileged notion of ‘Existence’ or 
‘Reality’, such that the objects and properties to which sentences correspond Exist or are Real in this sense. 
For if they were just working with our everyday notion of ‘existence’, it would be trivial that ‘The table is near 
to the chair’ corresponds to a table, as the sentence trivially implies that a table exists (at least in our ordinary 
sense of ‘exists’). Most of the cheap truth theorists seem to reply on some such implicitly distinction between 
ordinary existence/reality and metaphysically significant Existence/Reality, such that it is the things we take to 
Exist that constitute our metaphysical commitments. In his 2010 paper Cameron makes this explicit by 
appealing to Sider’s (2008/2012) notion of quantificational structure, and I have confirmed with Williams in 
conversation that he intends his talk of what worlds ‘represent to be the case’ (Williams 2010) to be 
understood as what obtains at a world in a metaphysically serious sense. Fine (2001) and Sider (2009, 2012) 
are more explicit, giving detailed accounts of how we are to distinguish between the way we carve the world 
and the way the world is carved in and of itself. 
However, although Horgan and Potrč give considerable credence to micro-simplism, their preferred 
view is the even more austere view that only one object is quantified over in the ontology room: the 
world itself, or as they call it the ‘blobject’. The blobject, by instantiating its various properties in 
spatio-temporally local manners, indirectly corresponds to our ordinary sentences. By instantiating 
various physical properties in table-ish and chair-ish spatio-temporal manners, the bloject can make 
true the sentence, ‘The table is near to the chair’. I will consider blobjectivist versions of Minimal 
Commitments, and hence of cheap truth theory, after I have considered micro-simplist versions. 
3: The anti-physicalist arguments and phenomenal transparency 
By ‘the anti-physicalist’ arguments I shall mean those arguments which try to establish an epistemic 
gap between the physical and the mental, and then to infer from that epistemic gap to a 
metaphysical gap inconsistent with the truth of physicalism. The zombie conceivability argument 
begins by trying to establish that zombies are conceivable. The first stage of the knowledge 
argument is to establish that Mary learns something new when she leaves her black and white room. 
The explanatory gap argument begins with some sense in which conscious states cannot be 
explained in terms of physical states.5 Each of these constitutes an interesting epistemic gap 
between the physical facts and the facts about consciousness. 
Each of these arguments then tries to establish some thesis about the special nature of phenomenal 
concepts, i.e. our concepts of conscious states qua conscious states, which is involved in facilitating 
the move from the epistemic gap to a modal or metaphysical gap. David Chalmers argues that the 
primary intension of a phenomenal concept is the same as its secondary intension. George Bealer 
focuses on the semantic stability of phenomenal concepts: roughly the fact that they’re not ‘twin-
Earthable.’6 Martine Nida-Rümelin has argued for property dualism on the basis of the fact that we 
grasp phenomenal qualities in deploying phenomenal concepts.7 And I have argued against 
physicalism on the basis that phenomenal concepts are transparent, i.e. that a phenomenal concept 
reveals the essence of the phenomenal quality is refers to.8 
The challenge I wish to put to cheap truth theories could be articulated with the premises of any of 
the arguments mentioned above. However, for the sake of keeping things simple I will focus on 
Chalmers’ two-dimensional argument against materialism, which goes as follows (where P is the 
                                                          
5 Chalmers 1996, 2002, 2009, Jackson 1982, 1986, Levine 1983. 
6 Bealer 1994, 2002. 
7 Nida-Rumelin 2007 
8 Goff 2011. 
complete physical truth, and Q is an arbitrary truth about consciousness, such as ‘Something is in 
pain’): 
(1) P&~Q is conceivable 
(2) If P&~Q is conceivable, then P&~Q is 1-possible 
(3) If P&~Q is 1-possible, then P&~Q is 2-possible or Russellian monism is true. 
(4) If P&~Q is 2-possible, physicalism is false. 
(5) Physicalism is false or Russellian monism is true.9 
Notice that premise 3 opens up a loophole for the physicalist: the adoption of Russellian monism. 
Understanding this loophole is important for understanding why the anti-physicalist arguments in 
themselves are not a threat to cheap truth theory, and hence for understanding why the arguments 
need to be reformulated in the manner I suggest in this paper if they are to pose a challenge to 
cheap truth theory. However, I will save this discussion for the next section; for the moment we can 
ignore this loophole and focus on a formulation of the argument Chalmers considers earlier in the 
paper before raising the issue of Russellian monism: 
(1) P&~Q is conceivable 
(2) If P&~Q is conceivable, then P&~Q is 1-possible 
(3) If P&~Q is 1-possible, then P&~Q is 2-possible. 
(4) If P&~Q is 2-possible, physicalism is false. 
(5) Physicalism is false. 
Understanding the argument requires a little understanding of Chalmers’ two-dimensional semantic 
framework, which I shall try to convey before turning to the argument.  
We can model the content of a concept as a function from possible world to referents (in what 
follows I will refer to concepts with underlined terms). For example, we can think of the concept 
president of the USA as a function that delivers at each world the thing that is the president of the 
USA in that world: delivers Obama in the actual world, delivers Romney in the possible world where 
Romney won the election, etc. Some concepts deliver the same referent at each possible world, or 
                                                          
9 Chalmers 2009. 
at least at each world at which they deliver anything at all. For example, water delivers H2O at each 
possible world at which it refers. 
Similarly, we can model sentences as functions from possible worlds to truth-values. ‘Obama is 
president of the USA’ delivers the truth-value true at the actual world, but the truth-value false at 
the world where Romney won the election. ‘Water is H2O’ delivers the truth-value true at every 
possible world. These functions of concepts and sentences are known as ‘intensions’.  
The essence of the two-dimensional framework is the supposition that each concept/sentence is 
associated with two functions from worlds to referents/truth-values.10 In the examples above, I was 
giving what Chalmers calls the ‘secondary intension’ of water, president of the USA and of sentences 
comprising terms which express those concepts. But Chalmers thinks these concepts and sentences 
are also associated with a primary intension. 
The difference between the primary and secondary intension is given by the way in which worlds are 
considered when evaluating the intension. When we are evaluating the primary intension, we 
consider worlds as actual; when we are evaluating the secondary intension we consider worlds as 
counterfactual. I will try to explain both these modes of evaluation, and the resulting distinction 
between primary and secondary intensions, in terms of ‘the XYZ world’: the world in which the 
colourless, odourless stuff in oceans and lakes is XYZ and H2O.  
To consider a world as actual is to consider it as a way the actual world might turn out to be. When 
we consider the XYZ world as actual, we are entertaining the supposition that the actual colourless 
odourless stuff in oceans and lakes is XYZ rather than H2O. On this supposition, water refers not to 
H2O but to XYZ, and ‘Water is H2O’ is not true but false. We can say, then, that the primary intension 
of water delivers the referent XYZ at the XYZ world, and the primary intension of water is H2O 
delivers the truth-value false at the XYZ world.11  
To consider a world as counterfactual is to consider it as a way things might have been. When we 
consider the XYZ world as actual, we bear in mind that the actual world is one where the colourless, 
odourless stuff in oceans and lakes in H2O, and we consider the XYZ as a way things aren’t but could 
have been. This leads to the more standard kind of intension I started this discussion by considering. 
Given that the actual colourless, odourless stuff in oceans and lakes is H2O, water refers to H2O in all 
                                                          
10 Usually Chalmers talks about terms, rather than concepts, having primary/secondary intensions. We might 
think of the intension of a concept C as corresponding to the intension of a term expressing C. I talk of 
concepts rather than terms to fit in with the discussion of phenomenal concepts, but the claims of the paper 
could be easily be expressed in terms of phenomenal terms rather than phenomenal concepts. 
11 Chalmers thinks of the worlds considered as actual as having ‘centres’ indicating the location of the 
speaker/thinker in the world. I shall ignore this subtlety to keep things simple. 
possible worlds, and ‘Water is H2O’ is true in all possible worlds. Therefore, we can say that the 
secondary intension of water delivers H2O at all worlds, and the secondary intension of ‘Water is 
H2O’ delivers the truth-value true at all worlds. 
Evaluating the primary intension of concept or sentence is, by definition, an a priori matter. Locating 
water at world W considered as actual W does not require knowing which world is in fact actual.12 
We just search in W for the colourless, odourless stuff that falls from the skies and fills oceans and 
lakes. But evaluating the secondary intension very often requires empirical knowledge of relevant 
facts about the actual world. To know the secondary intension of water I need to know what the 
actual colourless, odourless stuff in oceans and lakes is. 
In order to avoid trivialising the notion of a primary intension, we must restrict the kind of concepts 
which are deployed in the descriptions of the worlds used in the evaluation of a primary intension. 
To say that water has a primary intension is to say that, given enough information about a world 
considered as actual (and idealised rational faculties), we can work out what water refers to in that 
world. But this would be trivially true if the term ‘water’ was itself used in that description. We could 
then find the water by just looking for the stuff labelled ‘water’ in the description! 
To avoid this worry, Chalmers stipulates that descriptions of worlds involve only indexicals and 
semantically neutral vocabulary. A semantically neutral term is one whose reference does not 
depend on which conceivable scenario turns out to be actual. Water is not semantically neutral, as 
its reference depends on how the actual world turns out, but zero and philosopher seem plausible 
candidates.  
To turn to the argument, we can simplify things a little by thinking of premise 1 as the premise that 
zombies – entirely non-conscious physical duplicates of human beings – are conceivable (in fact, the 
conceivability of a zombie would be one instance of premise 1). Premise 2 relies on a general 
principle that if a sentence is conceivable, then it is ‘1-possible’, which is to say its primary intension 
is true at some possible world: the sentence is true at some genuine possible worlds considered as 
actual (e.g. ‘Water is XYZ’, is conceivable, and hence it is true at some genuine possible world: the 
world where the stuff in oceans and lakes is XYZ). Premise 3 (given our simplification) tells us that a 
sentences asserting the existence of zombies has identical primary and secondary intensions, and so 
if it is true at some world considered as actual then it is true at that world considered as 
                                                          
12 Chalmers defines the primary intension in terms of what could be known a priori given idealised rational 
faculties.  
counterfactual. Premise 4 tells us that the truth of some zombie asserting sentence at some possible 
world considered as counterfactual is inconsistent with physicalism.13 
Phenomenal transparency 
I want to focus in this sub-section on premise 3 of the two-dimensional argument: 
3. If P&~Q is 1-possible, then P&~Q is 2-possible 
Chalmers grounds premise 3 in the thesis that the primary intension of a given phenomenal concept 
is identical to its secondary intension: 
…the truth of premise 3 requires that both P and Q have primary intensions that coincide. In the case 
of Q, this claim is quite plausible… As Kripke noted, there does not seem to be the same strong 
dissociation between appearance and reality in the case of consciousness as in the cases of water 
and heat. Whilst it is not the case that anything that looks like water is water or that anything that 
feels like heat is heat, it is plausibly the case that anything that feels like consciousness is 
consciousness. So it is not clear that the notion of “pseudoconsciousness,” something that satisfies 
the primary intension of ‘consciousness’ without being conscious, is coherent. The same holds for 
other, more specific phenomenal properties. So there is a strong case that the primary and 
secondary intensions of phenomenal terms coincide. 
Premise 3, then, is reliant on the following thesis: 
Identity of Phenomenal Intensions: For any phenomenal concept, its primary intension is the same as 
its secondary intension.14  
                                                          
13 Chalmers uses the word ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ interchangeably.  
14 I am oversimplifying in two respects. As noted by Chalmers in the above quotation, premise 1 also requires 
that there is a no distinction between the primary and secondary intensions of P, which allows for the loophole 
of Russellian monism, which we will discuss below. However, what is crucial for Chalmers’ argument – modulo 
further qualifications I consider in footnote 17 – and for mine is that the primary and secondary intensions of 
phenomenal concepts are identical. Secondly, Chalmers also suggests an alternative way that the two-
dimensional argument might go through, even if phenomenal concepts have different primary and secondary 
intensions. If P&~Q is conceivable, then its primary intension is true at some world W conceived as actual. Our 
world must differ from W, as the primary intension of P&~Q is false at our world. Given that W is physically 
indiscernible from our world, there must be some extra non-physical objects or property at either our world or 
W. P contains a ‘that’s all’ fact, which specifies that there is nothing more in W than the physical facts specified 
by P. Therefore, there must be some extra non-physical object or property present in our world, which 
distinguishes our world from W. On this style of argument, even if we don’t have a priori access to what is 
required for consciousness to be satisfied, we do have a priori access to what is required from the primary 
intensions of consciousness to be satisfied (for consciousness to actually refer at a world considered as actual). 
We could form a concept consciousness*, which denotes the property expressed by the primary intension of 
consciousness, and replace all discussion of ‘consciousness’ or ‘ phenomenal properties’ in what follows with 
talk of ‘consciousness*’ and phenomenal* properties’, and then move from Phenomenal* Transparency to the 
It is Identity of Phenomenal Intensions that gets us from zombies at worlds considered as actual, to 
zombies at worlds considered as counterfactual; the latter being required to refute physicalism (in 
footnote 17 I discuss Chalmers’ suggestion for how to run the argument without relying on this 
premise). I want now to explore the implications of this thesis.  
We can think of the secondary intension of as capturing what the concept requires of reality for its 
satisfaction. The secondary intension of water tells us that water requires of each metaphysically 
possible world the existence of H2O: if H2O exists at world W then water is satisfied at W, if H2O does 
not exist at world W then water is not satisfied at W. Where the primary intension of a given 
concept differs from the secondary intension, we will not have a priori access to what that concept 
requires of reality for its satisfaction. In the case of water, we need to do empirical investigation in 
order to work out that water requires the existence of H2O for its satisfaction. But if the primary 
intension of a given concept is identical to its secondary intension, given that the primary intension 
is a priori evaluable, the secondary intension will also be a priori evaluable. For such a concept, what 
it requires of the world for its satisfaction will be a priori accessible. Therefore, Identity of 
Phenomenal Intensions implies that it is a priori what phenomenal concepts require of the world for 
their satisfaction.  
Call sentences which involve quantifiers rather than singular terms, and predicates which express 
phenomenal concepts, ‘phenomenal sentences’. If it is a priori what phenomenal concepts require 
for their satisfaction, then plausibly it is a priori what phenomenal sentences require for their truth. 
If we can know a priori what is required from reality in order for the concept pain to be satisfied, 
then we can know a priori what is required for the sentence, ‘There is something in pain’ to be true. 
Identity of Phenomenal Intensions, therefore, gives us reason to believe the following thesis: 
Phenomenal Transparency: It is a priori what phenomenal sentences require for their truth. 
Each of the anti-physicalist arguments, at some stage, relies on a similar principle asserting our 
transparent understanding of the metaphysical demands of phenomenal concepts/sentences: 
Bealer’s ‘semantic stability’, Nida-Rümelin’s ‘grasping’, my ‘transparency’. Indeed, in more recent 
work explicating the fundamental notions expressed by the two-dimensional framework, Chalmers 
talks explicitly in terms of phenomenal concepts being ‘referentially transparent’, in the sense that 
their extensions are knowable a priori.15   
                                                          
conclusion that cheap truth theory cannot account for truths about consciousness*. For the sake of keeping 
things simple, I shall ignore this complication in what follows. 
15 Chalmers 2012: Excursus 14.  Martine Nida-Rümelin (2007) gives a more detailed account of phenomenal 
transparency (defined on this page) in terms of the two-dimensional framework. 
Whether explicit or implicit, it is Phenomenal Transparency which is at the heart of each of the anti-
physicalist arguments. Without some such principle, it is hard to see how an epistemic gap between 
the physical and the phenomenal could have metaphysical significance.16 For if it is not a priori what 
phenomenal sentences require for their truth, then there will be an epistemic gap between the 
physical and the phenomenal for precisely that reason, even if those truth requirements entail 
physicalism. For example, suppose the sentence ‘There is someone who feels pain’ requires for its 
truth that there are c-fibres firing, but that that truth requirement is not a priori accessible. It follows 
that it is conceivable, but not possible, that there be c-fibres firing without pain. If we cannot access 
the truth requirements of phenomenal sentences a priori, then that fact in itself entails an epistemic 
gap between the physical and the phenomenal in a way that has no implications for whether or not 
physicalism is true. 
There is good reason, then, to think that all the standard anti-physicalist arguments depend on a 
commitment to Phenomenal Transparency. Whilst I do not have space here to go into the details of 
each of the anti-physicalist arguments, I hope at least to have shown that premise 3 of Chalmers’ 
argument depends on a commitment to Phenomenal Transparency.17  
4. Anti-physicalist forms of cheap truth theory  
It might be thought obvious that the anti-physicalist arguments threaten cheap truth theory. It is 
often supposed that the anti-physicalist arguments are trying to demonstrate that human mentality 
is fundamental, and the thesis that human mentality is fundamental seems inconsistent with a view 
which commits only to concrete simples (given certain other extremely plausible assumptions we 
will explore below). However, the anti-physicalist arguments are not trying to demonstrate that 
human mentality is fundamental; they are in general consistent with non-physicalist forms of 
reductionism about human mentality. This is made explicit in Chalmers’ argument by its allowance 
for the loophole of Russellian monism.  
                                                          
16 One interesting exception is Joe Levine’s (2014) recent defence of an argument for the best explanation 
against physicalism: Levine thinks the best explanation of the explanatory gap is that there is a metaphysical 
gap. The anti-physicalist arguments I am concerned with in this paper are attempts to demonstrate the falsity 
of physicalism a priori. 
17 To be more precise, premise 3 of Chalmers’ argument is dependent on the referential transparency of 
phenomenal concepts, which I have argued makes Phenomenal Transparency extremely plausible. Perhaps 
there is room for the cheap truth theorist to respond to the argument of this paper by accepting that 
phenomenal concepts are referentially transparent, but denying Phenomenal Transparency as I have defined it 
above (in terms of phenomenal sentences). This would be an interesting position to explore. The aim of this 
paper is to set up a debate which needs to be had, rather than explore every possible move in that debate. 
Russellian monism, a view inspired by (independent) writings of Russell and Eddington from the 
1920s,18 is currently enjoying a great deal of attention in the philosophical literature on the mind-
body problem.19 There are two basic claims involved in the view. Firstly the claim that the physical 
sciences only characterise matter in terms of its structural or extrinsic nature, leaving us in the dark 
about the (more than structural) intrinsic nature which realises that structure. Let us call the 
properties in terms of which the physical sciences characterise matter ‘pure physical’ properties, and 
the (more than structural) intrinsic properties of matter which according to Russellian monism the 
physical sciences do not reveal to us ‘deep’ properties. Secondly, Russellian monists claim that it is 
the deep properties of matter which explain consciousness, and that it is the failure of the physical 
sciences to characterise this deep nature which accounts for the mind-body problem.20  
To put it in terms of Chalmers’ two-dimensional framework, the Russellian monist holds that 
although the primary and secondary intensions of phenomenal concepts coincide, the primary and 
secondary intensions of physical concepts come apart. The primary intension of, say, mass picks out 
the pure physical nature of mass, whilst the secondary intension of mass picks out its deep nature. It 
is because the primary and secondary intensions of physical concepts come apart that zombies are 
conceivable. If we could conceive of matter in terms of its deep physical nature zombies would cease 
to be conceivable.  
Is Russellian monism a form of physicalism? It depends on how we define physicalism. Some take 
physicalism to be the view that ideal physics exhaustively describes fundamental reality. Clearly 
Russellian monism is not a form of physicalism on such a definition. Others define physicalism as the 
view that physics is referentially adequate, in the sense that the fundamental facts, individuals or 
properties are those which are the subject matter of ideal physics, leaving it open whether or not 
ideal physics reveals their complete nature.21  
In either case, the standard ‘anti-physicalist’ arguments do not rule it out, and for this reason the 
standard anti-physicalist arguments are not, in themselves, a threat to cheap truth theory. For we 
could construe Russellian monism as a form of cheap truth theory: the only items in the correct 
ontology are physical simples instantiating deep properties; states of affairs involving complex 
                                                          
18 Russell 1927, Eddington 1928. 
19 See for example Pereboom 2011, and the essays collected in Alter & Nagasawa 2015. 
20 The general understanding of ‘structure’ in this context is roughly what can be captured in vocabulary 
involving only mathematical, formal and nomic terms. Russellian monists follow Russell (1927: 325) in arguing 
that there must be more to the nature of concrete reality than causal structure.  
21 See Ney 2008 for a good survey of views on this aspect of the definition of physicalism. 
arrangements of these simples make true sentences concerning human mentality. Most agree that 
this option is not ruled out by the anti-physicalist arguments. 
Whilst not referring specifically to Russellian monism, Theodore Sider has also pointed out that anti-
physicalist arguments are no threat to cheap truth theory. In his recent defence of micro-simplist 
cheap truth theory,22 he consider what he calls the ‘Cartesian argument’ against it: 
1. I exist  
2. I am not a simple entity 
3. Therefore, there is at least one entity which is not simple. 
Sider claims that although I may have Cartesian certainty that sentences concerning my existence 
are true, I have no good reason to think that such sentences need be made true by a single entity 
that has my conscious experience, a thesis he dubs ‘metaphysical singularity’: 
Rejecting materialism about the world would not on its own support metaphysical singularity. 
Irreducible or supervenient mentality could consist of irreducible or nonsupervenient mental 
relations which relate many subatomic particles, rather than irreducible or nonsupervenience 
mental properties that are instantiated by single entities.23  
Whilst Sider is right that anti-physicalism is consistent with cheap truth theory, I will try to show in 
the next section that the key premises of the anti-physicalist arguments pose a threat to cheap truth 
theory of which Sider is unaware.  
5: The phenomenal mirroring argument 
Following J. R. G. Williams, we can think of cheap truth theories as advocating an anti-Quinian 
account of the truth requirements of sentences, or at least sentences in contexts.24 If the sentence, 
‘There is a party at Bill’s’, only requires for its truth that there be people dancing, drinking, etc. at a 
certain location, then the truth of ‘There is a party at Bill’s’ can consist in an indirect correspondence 
between the sentence and the people gathered at the relevant location. We can say that ‘There is a 
party at Bill’s’ has ‘indirect truth requirements’, i.e. requirements that can be satisfied by entities 
other than those the sentence quantifies over, properties other than those expressed by the 
sentence’s predicates, etc. Where a sentence (or a sentence in a context) has indirect truth 
requirements, the truth of that sentence may consist in an indirect correspondence with reality.  
                                                          
22 Sider 2012b. Actually, Sider is somewhat agnostic over whether we can get full blown truth on the cheap, or 
merely semantic correctness.  
23 Sider 2013: 29. 
24 Williams 2010. 
However, there may be certain sentences, or certain sentences in certain contexts, which lack 
indirect truth requirements, and hence can only be satisfied by a direct correspondence with reality. 
Call such sentences ‘mirroring sentences.’ Sentences concerning God are plausible candidates for 
mirroring sentences. The sentence, ‘God exists’, seems to require for its truth nothing less than the 
existence of the entity it quantifies over. 
In general, whether or not our sentences are mirroring sentences will not be a priori accessible. 
However – and here is where the premises of the anti-physicalist arguments start to become 
relevant – if we accept Phenomenal Transparency, then the truth requirements of phenomenal 
sentences will be a priori accessible. If the truth requirements of phenomenal sentences are a priori 
accessible, then it will presumably be a priori accessible whether or not those truth requirements 
are indirect, and hence whether or not phenomenal sentences are mirroring sentences.  
I submit that, if it is indeed the case that the truth requirements of phenomenal sentences are a 
priori accessible, it is extremely plausible that phenomenal sentences are mirroring sentences. When 
we reflect on what would be required for ‘There is something in pain’ to be true, the only state of 
affairs that suggests itself as sufficient is there being some entity that feels pain, as a state of affairs 
which involves the entity quantified over by the sentence. Contrast with the sentence ‘There is a 
party’. When we reflect on what would be required for this sentence to be true, it is apparent to us 
that it would be sufficient for its truth that there be people gathered together revelling, a state of 
affairs which does not involve the entity quantified over. In this way, it is apparent upon reflection 
that ‘There is a party’ has indirect truth requirements. However, in the case of phenomenal 
sentences, no such indirect requirements are apparent to reflection, even when we consider 
different contexts in which the sentence might be used.25 
Having said that, there is an option for those wanting to hold that there are a priori accessible 
indirect truth requirements of phenomenal sentences: give some kind of causal analysis of 
phenomenal sentences. An analytic functionalist may take it to be a priori that what is required for 
‘There is something in pain’ to be true is for a certain causal role R to be realised, where this may 
involve a single state playing R, or may involve a number of entities (e.g. particles) acting in concert 
to play R. In so far as it is a priori that the truth requirements of this sentence may be satisfied by 
many things which aren’t subjects of experience (e.g. non-conscious particles acting in concert to 
play a certain causal role), this would seem to constitute an a priori accessible indirect truth 
requirement of this sentence.  An analytic behaviourist, or an analytic representationalist, may give a 
similar account. Theodore Sider attempts to give a functionalist account of the ‘metaphysical truth 
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conditions’ (roughly what I am calling truth requirements) of some of our ordinary sentences, in the 
defence of cheap truth theory.26 
At this point the epistemic premise of the anti-physicalist arguments has relevance. For in zombie 
worlds things are arranged causally as the analytic functionalist believes to be required for the truth 
of ‘There is something in pain’, and yet in the zombie world ‘There is pain’ is not true. Therefore, if 
what is required for ‘There is something to be in pain’ to be true is a priori accessible, and the 
analytic functionalist is correct about what is required for ‘There is something to be in pain’ to be 
true, then zombie worlds would not be conceivable. Of course it follows that if zombie worlds are 
conceivable, and what is required for ‘There is something in pain’ to be true is a priori accessible, 
then the analytic functionalist must be wrong about what is required for ‘There is something in pain’ 
to be true.  
Putting such causal analyses of phenomenal sentences on one side, I know of no other theory of 
phenomenal sentences which might yield indirect truth requirements of phenomenal sentences 
which are a priori accessible. Perhaps some might say that there are indirect truth requirements of 
phenomenal sentences, but we just haven’t uncovered them yet. A few decades of searching for the 
truth requirements of knowledge claims has not yielded necessary and sufficient conditions for 
attributions of knowledge. Maybe it would be premature to infer from the fact that philosophers 
have not yet discovered a priori accessible indirect truth requirements of phenomenal sentences, to 
the fact that they don’t exist.  
However, the two cases are not relevantly similar. Even though philosophers have not managed to 
give a completely analysis of the concept of knowledge, in the sense of giving necessary and 
sufficient conditions for someone to know that p, we clearly have a rough idea of what is required 
for someone ‘to know that p’, and we are able to judge in particular cases not described using the 
verb ‘to know’ or related terms, whether or not those cases count as cases of knowledge. This makes 
us confident that the truth requirements of ‘X knows that P’ can be satisfied by state a state of 
affairs which can be specified without using the verb ‘to know’ or related terms.  
But in the case of ‘There is something in pain’ – again assuming the falsity of causal analyses of that 
sentence – careful reflection does not yield even a rough idea of how entities other than the one 
quantified over by that sentence could make that sentence true; nor can we imagine a single state of 
affairs involving such entities which strikes us as sufficient for its truth. Careful reflection yields 
nothing that might sufficient for the truth of ‘There is something in pain’ other than the existence of 
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something that feels pain. Believing that there are a priori accessible indirect truth requirements for 
phenomenal sentences (other than those given by causal analyses), when no careful investigation 
yields no suggestion of their existence, is an unwarranted leap of faith.27 
One might be tempted to think that most sentences are such that there are no a priori accessible 
indirect truth conditions. But in general this need not be a problem for cheap truth theories. The 
cheap truth theorist could claim that ‘There are tables’ requires for its truth that particles be 
arranged table-wise, even though it is not a priori accessible that the sentence has these truth 
requirements; the truth requirements of sentences about tables may be determined by facts outside 
of what is a priori accessible. However, if we accept phenomenal transparency, then supposed 
indirect truth requirements of phenomenal sentences are either a priori accessible or they don’t 
exist at all. 
Let us put this all together. If we accept that zombies are conceivable, then we have very good 
reason to think that there are no a priori accessible indirect truth requirements of phenomenal 
sentences, as the conceivability of zombies rules out the only plausible candidates. If we further 
accept phenomenal transparency, the thesis that the truth requirements of phenomenal sentences 
are a priori accessible, then we have very good reason to think that the truth requirements of 
phenomenal sentences are not indirect, given that phenomenal sentences lack a priori accessible 
indirect truth requirements. The two crucial premises of the anti-physicalist arguments push us to 
the conclusion that phenomenal sentences lack indirect truth requirements.  
We can put the argument as follows: 
The phenomenal mirroring argument 
1. If zombies are conceivable then phenomenal sentences lack a priori accessible truth 
requirements. 
2. If phenomenal transparency is true, then: if phenomenal sentences lack a priori accessible 
indirect truth requirements, then phenomenal sentences lack indirect truth requirements. 
3. Zombies are conceivable.  
4. Phenomenal transparency is true. 
5. Therefore, phenomenal sentences lack indirect truth requirements, i.e. phenomenal 
sentences are mirroring sentences.  
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This would obviously be an unwelcome conclusion for cheap truth theorists. The commitment to 
Moorean Truth will not allow them to give up on the truth of phenomenal sentences; if anything 
Moorean Truth it is that there are the subjects of experiences we ordinarily take them to be, with 
more or less the conscious experience we pre-theoretically associate with them. If phenomenal 
sentences lack indirect truth requirements, then accepting their truth will require an ontological 
commitment to subjects of experience. But the cheap truth theorist adherence to Minimal 
Commitments entails that we can be ontologically committed to subjects of experience only if we 
take them to be simple, concrete entities.  
Supposing the cheap truth theorist commits only to micro-level simples, she will be forced to identify 
the subjects of experience we pre-theoretically believe in with micro-level simples. This is clearly not 
an attractive view. Firstly, there is a concern about arbitrariness: it is hard to see what could 
determine which of the huge number of micro-level simples within my body the subject of my 
experience is identical with. Secondly, it is surely a Moorean truth that the subject of my experience 
causes much of my behaviour; if the subject of my experience is a single micro-level simple, it could 
not have the causal impact on my behaviour we pre-theoretically suppose that it has. Finally, it is 
plausibly a Moorean truth in its own right that the subject of my experience is not a micro-level 
simple. There are some anti-physicalists who adopt panpsychism, the view that micro-level simples 
have a crude form of consciousness,28 but even on these views micro-level subjects do not 
instantiate the kind of experience we have a Moorean commitment to.  
Suppose the cheap truth theorist commits only to the blobject. It is perhaps slightly more plausible 
to suppose that the universe instantiates my phenomenal properties than it is to suppose that a 
fundamental particle does. Following Horgan and Potrč, we might say that the universe instantiates 
my phenomenal properties R-wise, where R-wise is the spatio-temporal manner corresponding to 
my brain. One might have concerns about the intelligibility of phenomenal properties being 
instantiated in spatio-temporal manners, but let us put such concerns to one side.  
The real trouble for blobjectivists comes when try to make sense of phenomenal sentences that 
quantify over multiple subjects of experience, e.g. ‘There is something that feels pleasure and no 
pain, and something that feels pain but no pleasure.’ Just as reflection does not reveal a state of 
affairs intuitively sufficient for the truth of ‘There is something that feels pain’, other than one that 
involves the existence of a pained subject, so reflection does not reveal a state of affairs intuitively 
sufficient for the truth of ‘There is something that feels pain but no pleasure, and something that 
feels pleasure but not pain’, other than the state of affairs of there being two subjects, one feeling 
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pain but no pleasure and one feeling pleasure but no pain. It would not be correct to describe a state 
of affairs in which one thing feels both pleasure and pain – albeit in distinct spatio-temporal 
manners of instantiation – as a state of affairs in which that sentence is true.  
It is not that there is anything incoherent with micro-level simples somehow constituting a subject of 
experience, or the cosmos in some sense grounding the existence of a subject. There are various 
anti-physicalist views according to which fundamental particles constitute subjects in virtue of their 
physical and non-physical properties. However, this kind of view is not cheap truth theory as I’ve 
defined it. Cheap truth theory is not just the view that simple concrete entities are metaphysically 
basic, but that they are the only entities that we are ontologically committed to. The only way to 
make this theory consistent with Minimal Commitments as I have defined it is to identify subjects of 
experience with immaterial souls. Although consistent with the letter of cheap truth theory, I take it 
that such a weighty ontological commitment is at odds with its spirit.  
6: A debate that needs to be had 
I hope to have made a case for the importance of linking up two areas of the philosophical literature 
which have so far existed in isolation: cheap truth theories in the metaphysics literature, and 
debates between physicalists and anti-physicalists about consciousness in the philosophy of mind 
literature. The anti-physicalist arguments in their standard formulations are not a threat to cheap 
truth theory, because – as Sider notes – the cheap truth theorist might adopt an anti-physicalist 
form of cheap truth theory. However, I have shown how the key premises of those arguments – 
Phenomenal Transparency and Zombie Conceivability – can be worked into an argument to the 
conclusion that phenomenal sentences are mirroring sentences, a thesis very hard to reconcile with 
cheap truth theory. 
Of course those premises might be denied. By far the more popular response of contemporary 
physicalists to the anti-physicalist arguments involves denial of the referential transparency of 
phenomenal concepts. However, as physicalists have discovered, this is easier said than done. The 
opposite extremely to taking phenomenal concepts to be referentially transparent, is taking them to 
be referentially opaque: revealing nothing of the nature of their referents. In the 1990s and early 
2000s many physicalist offered pure semantic externalist theories of phenomenal concepts which 
appeared to have that implication.29 However, there is a growing consensus among both physicalist 
and anti-physicalists that this opposite extreme is deeply implausible. Conceiving of conscious states 
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under phenomenal concepts seems to reveal something substantial or significant about their nature; 
physicalist Benedicté Veillet has dubbed the requirement that physicalists account for this in a way 
consistent with physicalism ‘the new challenge.’30 
A number of physicalists have recently tried to answer this challenge, offering accounts of 
phenomenal concepts such that they are referentially translucent: revealing something significant 
about conscious states, but without revealing their physical nature. For example, according to 
physicalist Robert Schroer, phenomenal concepts are descriptive concepts which reveal how 
conscious states are composed from more basic elements, where those more basic elements are 
denoted by referentially opaque sub-concepts; e.g. it is a priori that a particular shade of 
phenomenal orange is composed of phenomenal red hue and phenomenal yellow hue, where the 
sub-concepts phenomenal red hue and phenomenal orange hue are referentially opaque concepts 
referring to physical states.31 There are difficulties facing Schroer’s account, and others that have 
been proposed, but I will not explore these difficulties here.32 
In the context of cheap truth theory, we might understand the ‘new challenge’ as the need to give 
an account of phenomenal concepts such that they reveal something substantial about the nature of 
phenomenal properties, but without leading to the indirect truth requirements of phenomenal 
sentences being revealed a priori. Alternately cheap truth theorist may choose to embrace 
Phenomenal Transparency whilst revisiting the now unpopular position in philosophy of mind of 
denying the conceivability of zombies and giving a causal analysis of mental concepts.  
Either way, the cheap truth theorist needs to give some account of phenomenal concepts which is 
both plausible and entails that the truth requirements of phenomenal sentences are indirect. It is 
not obvious how this can be done, as is indirectly evidenced by the difficulty contemporary 
physicalists have giving accounts of phenomenal concepts consistent with physicalism.  
There is obviously lots more to be said, but the aim of this paper is to indicate that there is a debate 
here that needs to be had, rather than to examine every possible move within that debate. The 
Phenomenal Mirroring Argument poses a significant challenge to the cheap truth theorist; a 
response is due.  
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